

Beyond the Table

Infrastructure Development in Kampala, Uganda

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It was midnight, and Judith Tukahirwa Tumusiime, deputy executive director of the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA), woke up for her night shift as the supervisor of a major road project in Kampala, Uganda. The site where she would be working early that morning was made possible by a \$33 million loan the World Bank awarded to Uganda as part of the Kampala Infrastructure and Institutional Development Project (KIIDP, pronounced “k-dip”).

KIIDP was quickly approaching its expiration date. If Tumusiime’s team failed to fully implement the project by the end of the year, they risked foregoing future World Bank assistance for Kampala. As she put on her hard hat and prepared to leave her home, Tumusiime was carefully planning how she should pursue a second phase with the World Bank for much needed infrastructure projects in Kampala.

Inside Kampala, Uganda

Kampala was the capital city of the landlocked East African country of Uganda.¹ In 2016, Kampala accounted for 50 percent of Uganda’s gross domestic product (GDP), and Uganda’s development relied on Kampala’s management and connectivity to the rest of the country.² According to the World Bank, “With sustained and high economic growth [over the last two decades], Uganda has reduced poverty substantially.”³ However, nearly one in five Ugandans continued to live in poverty, earning under \$1.90 per day.⁴

In Uganda, as in other emerging economies, road infrastructure was tied to poverty reduction.⁵ By 2016, nearly half of all vehicles in Uganda were used for public transit, primarily minibuses called “Matatus.” Matatus were “the major regular means of transport for the majority of urban Ugandans.”⁶ Improved infrastructure provided both direct benefits, through employment for drivers, and indirect benefits, through greater mobility and access to employment.⁷ (See Appendix 2 for an image of road conditions.)

Despite the importance of roads to Kampala’s development, the City’s government struggled to build the necessary infrastructure to accommodate its growing economy and population, which had increased from 330,000 people in 1970 to 1.5 million in 2014.^{8,9} The UN reported that poor traffic conditions cost the City 24,000 man hours each day.¹⁰ Beyond traffic congestion, the City also experienced difficulties delivering key services, such as sewage and trash collection, to the majority of its population.¹¹

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Kampala’s economic reforms, which had begun in the late 1980s, “created further drivers for rural-urban migration” and hindered the city government’s “ability to offer quality services with respect to roads, drainage management, street parking, and lighting.”¹² In addition to the challenges stemming from rapid population growth, the City struggled with “poor organization, management, financial and human resource capacity.”¹³ Because the opposition party had been in control of Kampala, the party affiliated with the Ugandan president frequently attempted to undermine local politics and sought opportunities to regain control of the capital city.¹⁴

Since the 1980s, the World Bank had provided Kampala with financial and technical support for infrastructure development and service provision.¹⁵ Throughout the 1990s, the World Bank was the only donor focused on Uganda’s urban sector.¹⁶ When the government of Uganda sought additional assistance in the early 2000s to pursue its Strategic Framework for Reform (SFR), the World Bank recognized the need for sustained development and improvements in the livelihoods of Kampalans but expressed concern that Kampala City Council’s (KCC) commitment to the SFR had “diminished.”¹⁷ Nonetheless, the World Bank decided to fund KIIDP as a three-phase Adaptable Lending Program (ALP), noting that “if support ceases now, there is a real prospect that the progress achieved to date will unravel.” The phased project provided the World Bank with an “exit strategy” if Kampala did not meet targets.¹⁸

Kampala and the World Bank envisaged KIIDP 1 as the first of three projects. (See Table 1.) The first phase focused specifically on financial recovery through improved tax collection, service delivery, and roads. (See Appendix 3 for its relevance to Uganda’s SFR.)^{19,20} This \$33 million project was approved in 2007. However, by its original proposed closing date of 2010, only 30 percent of the project had been completed.²¹

Table 1: Original Financing Plan for KIIDP						
Adapted from 2007 World Bank Project Appraisal Document, Report No: 35847-UG, page 1						
Program Financing Plan						
KIIDP	Indicative Financing Plan				Estimated Implementation Period	
	World Bank (US\$ millions)	% of total	Gov. of Uganda (US\$ millions)	Total (US\$ millions)	Commitment Date	Closing Date
Phase 1	33.6	37	3.5	37.1	1/1/2008	12/31/2010
Phase 2	40.0	44	4.0	44.0	1/1/2011	12/31/2014
Phase 3	17.4	19	1.5	18.9	1/1/2015	12/31/2017
Total	91.0	100	9.0	100.0		

During KIIDP 1’s implementation, Kampala’s local governance changed from the locally-controlled KCC to the central government-controlled KCCA. The KCCA was headed by a locally elected Lord Mayor and an Executive Director appointed by the president, the latter being responsible for the City’s day-to-day management. Jennifer Musisi, the first Executive Director of the KCCA, was appointed in April 2011. One of her first tasks was assembling a team.

Judith Tumusiime

After earning a master's degree in environment and natural resources, Tumusiime pursued a PhD in urban sanitation and solid waste management in the Netherlands. This technical background led her to a position as a researcher at Uganda's Ministry of Water, Lands, and Environment, working on a multinational World Bank-funded lake project.²² She later worked on a contract with the US Agency for International Development, and from there she was recruited to join a changeover team managing the administrative transition from the City's previous governance structure to the KCCA. "I came in to serve my country by bettering the lives of Kampalans and improving the services we provided to the people," reflected Tumusiime.²³

In May 2011, Tumusiime joined the KCCA as a technical consultant. "When I first came to KCCA, I didn't know what was going on and what projects we had in the Authority. City Hall had a few old computers and so many broken windows. And it was surrounded by street vendors, which also saturated the rest of the City," she said.²⁴ There was little inherited knowledge of the system that had previously been in place and, according to Julius Kabugo, the Financial Advisor for KCCA, "You didn't know where things existed until you ran into them."²⁵

The Scope of the Problem

When Tumusiime first began her position as a technical consultant for the KCCA, she found herself responsible for projects well beyond the scope of her experiences as a health and sanitation expert. Musisi, the Executive Director of the KCCA, tasked her with taking over KIIDP 1, which by then had been struggling for four years. Tumusiime accepted the challenge. "I might not have an engineering background," she said, "but I could tell if a road was paved or not."²⁶

Tumusiime's first meeting with the World Bank in 2011 painted a grim picture of the project's viability. "The World Bank had already written to terminate the project and stop funding. If they followed through, it meant that the money that remained unspent would have to be returned to the World Bank. Uganda would have had to continue repaying the money if it was still being spent," said Kabugo. Only \$9.4 million of the \$33 million loan had been disbursed, and given the lack of progress and her status as a newcomer with little experience in urban infrastructure, Tumusiime believed the World Bank was skeptical about her ability to turn this project around.²⁷ She considered what changes would be required to build her credibility, earn the World Bank's trust, and finally complete KIIDP 1.

"One of the concerns the World Bank had was suspicion of corruption, and they were skeptical of the performance of the team. They were not sure we had the capacity to supervise the project,"²⁸ said Tumusiime. The World Bank's frustration did not exist in isolation: a year prior, in 2010, eleven donor agencies collectively agreed to reduce or restructure their commitments to Uganda as a result of acute cases of corruption.²⁹ "It was common knowledge that donors were unhappy," said Tumusiime. "It was all over the news. But this motivated me to go in and work."³⁰

Tumusiime, having previously worked for donor agencies, was no stranger to the development sector. Her experiences working for aid institutions led her to recognize something important. She said, "I was saddened by their thinking about us, the way donors viewed us as a developing country that was corrupt, had no capacity, and lacked people with integrity and passion. They portrayed Africa as the

worst place in terms of humanitarian issues. These donor countries are so developed, so I was thinking to myself, ‘Why can’t we do this for our country?’” Tumusiime knew she had to quickly regroup and prevent the current project from collapsing. She said, “I wanted to show them that we were a different breed of people—Ugandans with high integrity.”³¹

Digging In: Designing a New Approach

For Tumusiime, KIIDP 1 was an indispensable project that had the potential to transform the lives of millions of Kampala’s urban dwellers. She said, “With such an opportunity, we just dove in and made sure we did whatever we could.”³² She was aware of the social and economic costs to the budding KCCA if this project failed to move forward. She wanted to tell the World Bank: “We are ladies, we are new, and we are going to be different.”³³

The World Bank country team responded to Tumusiime’s team by issuing her an ultimatum: KIIDP 1 had to be completed within the next year, or the World Bank would cancel the project and withdraw any unallocated funds.^{34,35} Similarly, the World Bank indicated the low likelihood that Kampala would be eligible to pursue the second phase of KIIDP with them, a significant departure from the original three-stage proposal. Nevertheless, she began work to turn around KIIDP 1 while her team was actively considering projects to be funded with a second loan. “My country was a developing country without resources for infrastructure or basic services,” said Tumusiime. “There was no way we could have realized so much progress in the City without the World Bank.”³⁶

Tumusiime soon learned of the myriad problems responsible for KIIDP 1’s delay, one of which involved the KIIDP implementation team. This team was hired as project staff to implement KIIDP, but they sat outside of the City’s governance structure. Thus, lack of oversight and accountability led to underperformance and delays.

Tumusiime knew that she had to proceed with caution given the delicate situation. The implementing team, made up entirely of men, was protective of its project and suspicious that a newly hired consultant would now oversee their day-to-day operations. This team did not provide accurate assessments of their challenges and progress, and it was unclear whether Tumusiime had the authority to supervise them.³⁷ She knew that if she wanted to prove her competency to the World Bank, she had to quickly transform this team.

In early conversations with the implementation staff, Tumusiime learned that the problem did not stop with them but extended to the contracting firm hired to build the roads. Despite her reassurances, the staff in the implementing team knew their jobs were at stake and began to heed Tumusiime’s instructions. Tumusiime said, “I’m always smiling, but when things need to be done, they need to be done.”³⁸ When someone did something right, she made sure to praise them publicly. “This was something they hadn’t experienced in the past, so they appreciated it,” she said. “I made the decision to be a part of this team and in their everyday tasks. I was on the road every day.”³⁹

Tumusiime also developed new strategies for internal accountability, which reduced delays. For example, in determining the right course of action to address construction delays, she discovered that the contractor had run out of capital by stretching itself thin across different projects, and was unable to pay its employees.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, according to Michael Kizza, one of the project engineers, the

supervisor who was hired to monitor progress had done the bare minimum, and placed the blame on the contracting company. Rather than disciplining the contractors, Tumusiime decided to fire the supervisor and offered the contractors additional technical assistance and resources to help them perform their duties.

Balancing Multiple Stakeholders

In the early months of her job, Tumusiime's team made incremental, concrete progress on KIIDP 1. She provided updates to the World Bank on a monthly basis. Though pleased with the work Tumusiime and her team had completed, the World Bank was still uncertain about the project's future. "They said we didn't have enough capacity, and that Jennifer and I didn't have experience running a city," said Tumusiime.⁴¹ There were even allegations of staff corruption, which led to candid conversations between Tumusiime and the World Bank regarding the KCCA's human resources.⁴²

The World Bank demanded that the KCCA recruit more permanent staff, but the new agency lacked adequate resources to hire additional employees. "They wanted more staff, but KCCA had no money!" said Tumusiime. As a compromise, the KCCA hired short-term consultants to provide engineering assistance to the project. Throughout this process, Tumusiime took a zero-tolerance approach to corruption, leading to sixty-nine terminations, eight interdictions, and sixteen warnings.⁴³ These decisions not only proved beneficial to the KCCA, they also sent an early signal to the World Bank that Tumusiime was keen to collaborate with them.

As a development agency, the World Bank was ready to provide technical assistance to Tumusiime and her team, but only if she was willing to be supported. The World Bank team lead for Uganda, Senior Urban Specialist Martin Onyach-Olaa, said, "They came and took the guidance and advice seriously." Impressed with her desire to collaborate with the World Bank, Onyach-Olaa said, "Jennifer Musisi and Judith Tumusiime sat in every World Bank meeting from 9 am to 5 pm."

Engaging Uganda's Decision-Makers

Tumusiime regularly communicated KIIDP's progress with the Ugandan Ministry for Finance's leadership. When Tumusiime met with the minister, she knew she was in a weak position. Kampala had received a large loan from the World Bank, but the City was still under-delivering on the project. Furthermore, the minister's support would be necessary for any future loans for Kampala. While she had a technical background, her political experience was lacking.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, her progress to date and the relationships she established with donors, especially the World Bank, instilled confidence in her leadership abilities.

During one meeting with the ministry for finance's top leadership, Tumusiime requested an introduction with the chairman of a presidential committee. This committee was one of two national authorities that could authorize new foreign aid, and it was usually overwhelmed with meeting requests.⁴⁵ Tumusiime's newly established relationship with the minister for finance proved invaluable after he promptly connected her with the committee's chairman.

Echoing the World Bank's frustration with her team, the committee demanded higher accountability. "There was so much money involved that everybody was looking at us," Tumusiime said.⁴⁶ To appease

their concerns for better oversight, she invited a team of committee members to observe the project and presented them with regular reports. Her driven engagement was purposeful, as their support would be needed for the second loan.

Beyond the presidential committee, Uganda's parliamentary finance committees were also keen on providing oversight for this \$33 million loan, which was a massive figure for the country, amounting to three times Kampala's annual revenue.⁴⁷ Parliamentarians who did not explicitly oppose KIIDP lamented the project's emphasis on Kampala and fought for resources to their own communities outside the capital city.

If she had any hope of pursuing a second loan with the World Bank, Tumusiime needed to win over this parliamentary committee, which had the exclusive authority to introduce any foreign aid requests to the floor of parliament for debate and approval. Meanwhile, parliamentarians from the opposition party within this committee readily sought to fault the project, due in part to community backlash at consequences of the project's expedited implementation schedule.

Building On-The-Ground Tension

It was estimated that over 60 percent of Kampalans lived in slums.^{48,i} In Kampala, many slums were in wetland areas, which covered 16 percent of the City.⁴⁹ According to experts, "communities living in wetlands are exposed to a wide range of hazards and several vulnerability conditions."⁵⁰ One component of KIIDP 1 required the construction of new drainage channels in these wetlands.

Tumusiime's increased pace of implementation created resistance from groups of these informal settlers. Once the work on these drainage channels began, many Kampalans were outraged at being evicted from their homes by the administration.⁵¹ Tensions escalated after 500 residents sued the KCCA.⁵² When parliamentarians learned of the KCCA's attempts to evict these settlers, Tumusiime had to compromise and remove certain routes from their implementation plan.⁵³ Doing so reduced further criticism from parliamentarians and the World Bank regarding her leadership and judgment.

Encountering Local Barriers

Amidst her efforts to implement KIIDP 1, Tumusiime contemplated how to persuade the World Bank to provide the second loan for KIIDP 2. Initially, the World Bank indicated that Kampala would be an unlikely candidate for another loan given the difficulties in implementing KIIDP 1. Although Tumusiime and her team had made progress since then, the KCCA was still a young agency without a track record. Moreover, Tumusiime feared that parliamentarians from the opposition party could prevent the second loan from being approved.

She had good reason to be concerned. The changeover in Kampala's administration from the KCC to the KCCA had created intense political upheaval. Leadership of the KCCA were appointed by the Ugandan president; however, the locally elected Lord Mayor, Erias Lukwago, belonged to an opposition

ⁱ According to the United Nations, "slum dwellers lack formal supply of basic infrastructure and services, public space and green areas, and are constantly exposed to eviction, disease and violence." They often reside "in the most hazardous urban land." See United Nations Human Settlements Programme, "Habitat III Issue Papers, 22 – Informal Settlements" (United Nations Human Settlements Programme, May 31, 2005), accessed July 2019, https://unhabitat.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Habitat-III-Issue-Paper-22_Informal-Settlements.pdf.

party. Institutional reforms that created the KCCA reduced the position of Lord Mayor to a largely ceremonial role.⁵⁴ The new technical wing of city government, headed by Executive Director Musisi, accused Lukwago of incompetence and corruption, which led to an internal struggle seeking his impeachment.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the World Bank needed Tumusiime to engage with the Lord Mayor. Onyach-Olaa said, “If the head of an organization is not interested, you know there is going to be a crisis.”

The Lord Mayor made clear his opposition to KIIDP in an open letter criticizing the project.⁵⁶ He argued that the loan was too large, and that money could have been invested in other sectors like health or education. While the Lord Mayor’s position was largely ceremonial, he was the democratically elected, political representative of the City. Tumusiime knew that his support for any future project would be difficult to obtain.

The Road to KIIDP 2

Tumusiime’s ability to completely transform the struggling project was heralded as nothing short of a miracle. She was appointed deputy executive director of the KCCA in early December 2012. On Christmas Day of that year, only a year and a half since she was first hired by the KCCA, Tumusiime was out in the field to check that the last road of KIIDP 1 was complete. When the World Bank team was invited to inspect the project, they were astonished to see that all the roads were paved.⁵⁷ Although the KCCA requested an additional year to ensure that all elements of KIIDP 1 were finished, completion of the road projects was nonetheless a major accomplishment.

In an appraisal of the project, the World Bank wrote: “KCCA management has taken steps towards enhancing the culture of transparency and due process in the administration and governance within the city.”⁵⁸ From the World Bank’s perspective, Tumusiime was successful not only as an implementer, but also as a collaborative partner. Onyach-Olaa said, “They indicated that this was a team that could be trusted and that we could work with them.”

Creating a Vision for KIIDP 2

Because KIIDP was originally organized as a phased project, Tumusiime knew there was a possibility of seeking additional resources from the World Bank in the form of a second project, KIIDP 2. Throughout completion of KIIDP 1, Tumusiime’s team put together an inventory of critical road projects that would help reduce congestion in Kampala, at a total cost of nearly \$350 million. “They knew the need existed,” said Tumusiime. “We were informally trying to discuss with the World Bank whether it would be possible to get more funding.” She said that the World Bank knew her team was capable of doing more, given its demonstrated ability to turn around the KIIDP 1 project. “They dropped hints, like, ‘We don’t know if we can offer more funding, but based on your performance, this can be discussed.’”⁵⁹

After internal meetings with her team, Tumusiime presented this \$350 million proposal to Kampala’s officials, beginning with the five division mayors and the nearly thirty division council members. Each one of these meetings led to a continuously expanding budget proposal. “Some of these asks were unrealistic,” said Tumusiime. “Everyone wanted a road in front of their homes.”⁶⁰

The initial figure of \$350 million was many times higher than the \$44 million the World Bank had initially scoped for the second phase of KIIDP. While the KCCA was responsible for implementing KIIDP 1, the institution that received the loan was the Government of Uganda, so increasing the loan amount would require approval from parliament.

After an initial study found that Kampala needed \$1.5 billion to pave its entire road network, Tumusiime wanted to obtain as much funding as possible.⁶¹ She understood the costs of failure, since KIIDP 2 was projected to improve the mobility of 60 percent of Kampalans.⁶² Few other lenders besides the World Bank could provide large infrastructure financing.

Tumusiime was wary of potential opposition from parliament. “The opposition said we had not consulted with them enough. Parliamentarians told us we did not do enough community engagement and did not sensitize the public about how the project would affect their livelihood,”⁶³ she said. While the public would greatly benefit from better transportation infrastructure and improved mobility, there were concerns that her aggressive handling of informal settlers could lead to mass protest.⁶⁴

Navigating the Local and National Politics

Engaging with parliament and addressing their concerns were not as easy as extending a hand. Of the five parliamentarians who represented Kampala, four were from the opposition party and one was independent. “How do you communicate with the opposition when they want to fault the good work you are doing? Even if I wanted to engage them, my party was very suspicious of anyone working with the opposition. I could not be seen working with them,” said Tumusiime.⁶⁵

In an effort to carefully balance these political considerations, Tumusiime sent her staff to meet with opposing parliamentarians. “We made the risky decision to contact some parliament members from the opposition about what information they needed,” she said. “After we shared information with them, which we did not do previously, they quietly admitted that the work we were doing was important. They just couldn’t publicly support it.”⁶⁶

Rumors began to brew in the corridors of Kampala’s central government about Tumusiime’s desire to pursue a second loan with the World Bank, and political elites began to craft how they could profit from this deal.⁶⁷ For example, some parliamentarians began to indicate their desire to support her efforts if she provided concessions in the form of kickbacks. Tumusiime recounted, “Some of them asked for us to send them on retreats to evaluate the success of KIIDP 1. They asked to be placed in fancy hotels and be given daily allowances for their work. However, my integrity did not allow me to do this. We told them, ‘no.’”⁶⁸

Tumusiime knew that she had one major advantage in securing parliament’s approval for a second loan. Being affiliated with the president’s political party, she had enough parliamentarians to vote to support her proposal. However, the question became *when* the project would be approved, not *if*. The World Bank operated on deadlines, and the opposition party had enough tools in their pockets to frustrate the process and delay the vote.

Ready for the Future: Finding the Right Time for KIIDP 2

Tumusiime wanted to propose an ambitious KIIDP 2 project. If she and her team could pull it off, Kampala's residents would experience improved transportation and economic prosperity. However, the amount of money that would need to flow into the country would undoubtedly attract grafters and corruption.

There was also a looming threat from parliamentarians of the opposition party and the Lord Mayor. Tumusiime believed that change in the City needed to happen quickly. Approval of KIIDP 2 depended on whether the World Bank trusted Tumusiime and her team with another loan and whether the central government would allow for a loan focused once again on Kampala.

Her team was ready to submit their \$350 million proposal for KIIDP 2 to the World Bank. Was it the right time? Had she done enough to build support from the World Bank, parliamentarians, local stakeholders, and others? If not, what more could be done to improve her position?

Appendices

Appendix 1 Timeline of Events

Date	Action
November 2007	First phase of KIIDP project approved by World Bank
December 2010	Planned closing date for KIIDP 1 (30 percent of project complete)
April 2011	Jennifer Musisi appointed as first Executive Director of the KCCA
May 2011	Tumusiime hired as a technical consultant for the KCCA
December 2012	Tumusiime appointed deputy executive director of the KCCA; last road in KIIDP 1 project completed; KCCA requested one-year extension to complete remaining items of the project
December 2013	KIIDP 1 fully complete

Appendix 2 Road Conditions in Kampala, Uganda

This is a road in Kampala that would be paved in KIIDP 2. The uneven terrain was not conducive to mobility.



Source: "Kampala Infrastructure Development Projects," Lotti Ingegneria S.p.A., accessed July 2019, https://www.lottiassociati.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=149&Itemid=629.

Appendix 3 Proposed KIIDP Project and Relevance to Uganda’s Strategic Framework for Reform

This table was prepared by the World Bank for the first phase of the Kampala Institutional and Infrastructure Development Project (KIIDP) and highlights how the project maps onto Uganda’s Strategic Framework for Reform (SFR). The World Bank connected Uganda’s national strategic objectives to KIIDP components across three phases.

SFR-II Strategies & Priorities and KIIDP Project Design

SFR-II		KIIDP Components
SFR-II Strategies	Priority Activities identified to implement SFR-II strategies	
1. Institution policy formulation and performance	1. Institutional development <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institutional restructuring • Revenue enhancement • ICT • Urban planning 2. City-wide infrastructure and service improvement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Drainage system • Traffic and road maintenance management • Solid waste management • Urban markets infrastructure 3. Civil society participation and management <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support CSOs for effective participation • Increase transparency (SFR) 4. Monitoring & Evaluation of SFR-II	Component 1: Institutional Development (US\$5.8 million) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Human Resource Management • Support to Financial Recovery • Strengthening Service Delivery Component 2: Kampala City Infrastructure and Services Improvement (US\$28.5 million) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Drainage system improvement • Traffic management • Road maintenance and upgrading • Solid waste management • Urban markets infrastructure • Implementation of the Resettlement Action Plan Component 3: Project Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation (US\$2.8 million) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project Implementation Support • Monitoring and Evaluation • Annual Citizen’s Report Card • Staff and Councilor Survey
2. Political support, management and teamwork		
3. Communication and corporate image building		
4. Organizational reform		
5. Financial recovery		
6. Works and physical planning		
7. Public Health		
8. Management systems		

Source: World Bank, “Implementation and Completion Results Report (IDA-43670)” (Africa Region: World Bank, June 27, 2014), accessed July 2019, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/545191468349818537/pdf/ICR29160P078380IC0disclosed07020140.pdf>.

Appendix 4 World Bank Video about KIIDP

This video was created by the World Bank and shows how KIIDP impacted the lives of Kampalans on a personal level. It also emblematic of some of the road and drainage conditions in the City.



Kampala: A City on the Rise

Source: World Bank, "Kampala: A City on the Rise," August 19, 2014, accessed July 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTA8e-Kugbg>

Appendix 5 Photo of Jennifer Musisi (left) and Judith Tumusiime (right)

Source: Vision Reporter, "Musisi hails departing KCAA chief," *New Vision*, November 1, 2016, accessed July 2019, https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1439071/musisi-hails-leaving-kcca-chief

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